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told me a secret. 
I will close by noting that one important aspect of the relation between faith 
and evidence is entirely ignored in these papers. I concede that the papers are 
(as I have said) a miscellaneous collection, and that it would be absurd to fault 
such a collection for failing to be a comprehensive treatment of any topic. Still, 
I think the point is worth remarking on. One finds no mention in these papers 
of the fact that various people have attempted to disprove the beliefs of Christians 
and other theists. Unbelievers have, for example, attempted to demonstrate that 
the existence of God is incompatible with pain and suffering; or that religious 
beliefs are the products of depth-psychological or economic forces; or that 
religious beliefs are incompatible with known scientific fact; or that critical 
studies of central Biblical texts show these texts to be corrupt or historically 
unreliable or to have been intended by their authors in senses that do not support 
the theological superstructure that later generations have raised on them. I cannot 
discover in these papers any suggestion as to how a Christian should respond to 
arguments offered as disproofs of theism or as evidence of the scientific or 
historical untenability of Christian belief. Let me offer a rather extreme example. 
Suppose a Christian is assured by a freethinking acquaintance (who has read it 
in Godless Sunday at Home) that the Gospels were made up out of whole cloth 
by unscrupulous priests circa 400 A.D. Shall he say, "Maybe so, but I still 
intend to regard them as a promise of eternal life and a call to obedience?" No, 
he can't say that. He may, of course, assume that his acquaintance is lying or 
mistaken and put the matter out of his mind. That's all right. One who felt 
obliged to investigate every challenge to his convictions would be hard-pressed 
to find the time to act on his convictions. But if he finds he can't put the matter 
out of his mind, or if it looks to him as if there might really be something to 
his acquaintance's thesis, then it would seem that he must search out evidence 
and evaluate it. 
Marxism and Christianity, by Denys Turner. Totowa, N. J. : Barnes and Noble 
Books, 1983. Pages, xii and 256. $25.00. 
Marx's Social Critique of Culture, by Louis Dupre. New Haven and London: 
Yale University Press, 1983. Pages, ix and 299. $25.00. 
Reviewed by WILLIAM LEON MCBRIDE, Purdue University. 
Both Turner and Dupre are at home in the large border area that lies between, 
or more correctly is overlapped by, contemporary philosophy and religious 
studies. Both see in the work of Karl Marx, though not in much of what goes 
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by the name of "Marxist" movements today, material for profoundly positive 
insights into the condition of modem society. Beyond these basic similarities, 
however, their books exhibit a considerable divergence in philosophical and 
scholarly styles, in principal areas of interest, and in the degrees to which they 
express (whatever may be the states of their respective authors' fora interna) a 
sense of moral outrage and concomitant commitment to radical protest of some 
sort. Together, in other words, they make for a study, a potentially very interesting 
one, in complementarity and contrast. 
I shall proceed to undertake such a study, attempting in the process to actualize 
this potential, in three parts: (1) a brief summary of each book in tum, indicating 
its main themes; (2) an account of some of their complementarities and contrasts, 
with special emphases on their respective broader philosophical frames of refer-
ence and their respective treatments of the concept of ideology; and (3) an 
analysis, of necessity rather perfunctory, of Turner's central claim, "Morality is 
Marxism," since no other important contention in either book is so likely to 
attract the attention of so many of the readers of this journal. 
(1) Turner begins by disclaiming theological pretensions in this book and by 
highlighting his two theses, that of the "identity" between morality and Marxism 
already mentioned, and that of the "strong compatibility" between Marxism and 
Christianity, which "are in asymmetrical relations of dependence on one another." 
(p. ix) He identifies himself as one who "feels crushed between the moral 
cynicism of a Brezhnev and the moral hypocrisy of a Reagan." (p. xi) Part I, 
consisting of six chapters, develops the theme of ideology, raising the question 
as to how a set of lived butfalse beliefs is possible at all. Turner regards Marxism 
as a science of society which permits this question to be answered, although in 
elaborating upon this science he considers "Marx's writings as such" to be 
"unimportant." (p. 3) Beginning with a wide-ranging and somewhat unfocused 
discussion of praxis, he narrows his inquiry into the nature of ideology to the 
point of identifying it as "a praxis which internalises a systematic performative 
contradiction" (p. 31 )-an entire language of lived contradictory meanings, hence 
not conspiratorial in the way in which propaganda is. He makes extensive and 
interesting use of the nineteenth-century English expression, "one's betters", to 
illustrate the systematic ambiguity of ideological language. He then goes on to 
argue that the sustained denial that there exists class-conflict contributes to the 
dominance of the class in power and shows how the principle of toleration, as 
advanced by the theorists of interest-group pluralism and instanced in another 
way in R. M. Hare's insistence that no specific set of moral beliefs is entailed 
by his own analysis of "moral" language, has consequences within contemporary 
society which are in fact by no means morally neutral. This final chapter of Part 
I is the best and most fascinating. 
Part II, the focus of the "Morality is Marxism" theme, is the shortest. To be 
110 Faith and Philosophy 
very brief, since I shall be returning to this, I may summarize the direction of 
the argument by recalling Turner's views of Marxism as scientific, hence in a 
sense factual, and of ideology as systematically ambiguous, and then pointing 
out that he sees scientific Marxism's critical analysis of capitalism and of the 
ideological language in which capitalism is justified as constituting, eo ipso, a 
moral position-indeed, the only correct moral position-in contemporary soci-
ety. Marxism, according to Turner, thus presents itself as "the 'rescued truth' 
of bourgeois ideology" (p. 128), but not as a rival set of answers, a picture of 
some presumably better economic future. Moreover, since under capitalism a 
full-fledged lived morality is impossible, it is not surprising that Marxism is not 
expressed in moral language; for "to speak morally under capitalism we must 
refuse to moralise." (p. 152) 
There are moments in Turner's Part III in which the reader finds him playing 
the role of theologian malgre lui, with results that are not always, in my view, 
very satisfactory. The argument for a "strong compatibility" between Marxism 
and Christianity, with which this section begins, is actually a continuation of 
the previous discussion of morality and of Marxism as a moral force in the 
contemporary world. Here, Turner seems more defensive than he needs to be 
on the basis of that earlier discussion. He assures us, for example, that he is not 
claiming here that Christianity is true or that it is the source of distinctive insights 
of which Marxism must take account, but only that it "is a praxis which is 
situated in the terrain of the same problematic as Marxism is." (p. 159) But he 
also takes pains to distance himself from liberation theology, which he takes to 
be asserting too close a compatibility between Marxism and Christianity, and to 
reply to possible objections to his "strong compatibility" thesis from ontological 
and historical points of view. In subsequent chapters he attacks Louis Althusser's 
version of Marxism for its polemic against human subjectivity, discusses a 
"weak-compatibility thesis" which turns out to be much less easily defensible 
than that of strong compatibility (the latter "merely" asserts a dialectical inter-
dependence between Marxism and Christianity, whereas "weak compatibility" 
demands that there be no formal inconsistencies between them, a claim that 
could be refuted by a single counter-example), and further reveals his own deep 
discontent with all varieties of contemporary Christianity that maintain that either 
love or a Church community is possible under the conditions of capitalism. He 
speculates that the eventual achievement of a true human community entails, 
simultaneously, the Church's becoming a community and the Church's ceasing 
to exist, "which is why, for the Christian, the beginning of all criticism is the 
criticism of religion." (p. 223) He concludes that "what Marxism 'knows' it 
cannot know the true name of, that is God" (p. 249)-a notion that he has 
previously (pp. 230-31) identified with a "future state of affairs" outside history. 
In short, these concluding pages are not Turner's best from a logical point of view. 
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Dupre's book consists of five chapters together with a short introduction and 
conclusion. The topics of the chapter, to oversimplify somewhat for the sake of 
brevity, are alienation, nature and history, dialectic, economics, and ideology. 
Rather than to consider these topics in order, it will be more illuminating to 
summarize some of the book's principal themes, which are interwoven through-
out. One theme is suggested by the book's title: to wit, that Marx's work has 
important implications for Kulturkritik, both in his own time and today. There 
is much about the contemporary '"culture industry" that Dupre, quite properly, 
loathes; it is far worse than Marx would have dreamed, Dupre points out, but 
unfortunately Marx undercut the potential force of his own critical stance con-
cerning culture by overemphasizing the socio-economic basis of commodity 
fetishism and alienation (pp. 50-51). This remark points to what I regard as 
Dupre's single most important and cogently argued thesis, or set of theses, in 
the book: that the general according of primacy to the economic sphere, which 
Marx rightly deplored but identified strictly with capitalism, unfortunately shows 
signs of surviving with full force in post-capitalist societies, and that Marx's 
own critique of capitalism erred grievously by depicting this primacy as being 
too overwhelming and hence in conceding too much to what he set out to criticize. 
On the other hand, Dupre sees much of value in Marx's treatment of human 
labor, a topic that some would-be Marxian economists, as well as many others, 
regard as an embarrassment. 
Much of Dupre's book is concerned with tracing affinities and oppositions 
within the philosophical tradition in which Marx's thought developed. Feuerbach, 
in particular, emerges in this book as something of an intellectual villain, or at 
least an intellectual adulterator, both for his reduction of the concept of "alien-
ation" to its religious dimension, a move which deprives it of the rich cultural 
significance that it enjoyed in Hegel's Phenomenology and other works, and for 
his having refocused the notion of "dialectic" away from issues concerning the 
intrinsic relatedness of moments in a given conceptual whole, the principal 
concern of Hegelian dialectic, towards more extrinsic and even purely factual 
issues about the old opposition between speculative thought and sensuous reality, 
mind and nature (pp. 114-115). As Dupre traces it, the reduction of dialectics 
to a strictly empirical method achieves maximum entropy, so to speak, in the 
later tradition epitomized by Stalin, in whose writings the original revolutionary 
power of Marx's thought is lost. Dupre's careful studies of the evolution of such 
key concepts as alienation and dialectics from before Marx's time through Marx 
to later Marxisms permits him to shed new light on such fundamental questions, 
within this broad tradition, as that of the nature of historical necessity (it cannot 
be very strong, once one has abandoned the Hegelian hypothesis of Spirit) and 
that of the extent to which human beings, rather than blind, impersonal forces, 
make history. 
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I shall postpone consideration of themes in Dupre's Chapter Five, "The Uses 
of Ideology," until I can draw comparisons with Turner's ideas about the same 
concept in the next section. However, no summary of Dupre's book should be 
neglectful of his short concluding chapter, in which he steps further outside of 
the texts than has been his wont in order to articulate his own very balanced 
perspective on Marx's overall contribution to the critique of culture. Here, Dupre 
pays less attention to Marx's alleged overemphasis of economic considerations 
and of Ricardian "production for production's sake" (p. 280), which he has 
already discussed, and more attention to Marx's attribution of primacy to praxis 
over theory. This move, too, according to Dupre, was excessive on Marx's part, 
but at the same time our author does not wish to restore the primacy of theory 
so characteristic of pre-Marxian philosophical traditions. 
(2) The contrasts between the two books, even when their authors are attempting 
to deal with very similar themes, are striking. While neither is satisfied with the 
present state of social affairs, Turner exhibits outrage, whereas Dupre's tone is 
one of forceful but circumspect criticism. Turner flaunts his insouciant attitude 
towards the actual Marxian texts, whereas Dupre is first and foremost a careful 
textual scholar. Turner writes in nearly complete disregard of the philosophical 
tradition that was Marx's in his youth-Hegel receives at most three allusions, 
Feuerbach none throughout Turner's entire book-, whereas it is always against 
the background of that tradition that Dupre passes his judgments on Marx. Turner 
makes use of only a handful of other contemporary writers on topics related to 
his own-Terry Eagleton and Steven Lukes are perhaps the most frequently 
invoked, and they are not invoked very often-, whereas Dupre's list of secondary 
sources from the now rather broad methodological spectrum of discussants of 
Marx's thought, upon which he draws extensively, is exceedingly impressive. 
The drawbacks of some aspects of Turner's approach, as I have sketched it, 
become evident when one contrasts his use of the term, "dialectic," with Dupre's. 
(A number of other fundamental concepts in the Marxian tradition could serve 
a similar purpose for me here.) When, in the course of developing a sustained 
comparison between Aristotle's and Plato's morality and politics, Turner makes 
a rare reference to the notion of dialectics, his grasp of it appears highly superficial: 
"If Plato's science is non-dialectical because it bypasses ordinary experience, 
Aristotle's is non-dialectical for the opposite reason, that it merely offers an 
inductive resolution of inconsistencies at the level of that ordinary experience." 
(p. 99) (I leave to others a judgment concerning Turner's understanding of Plato 
and Aristotle as exhibited in this facile comparison.) His entire discussion of 
"Morality and the Science of Society," the chapter near the close of which this 
passage occurs, would have profited greatly from a brief allusion, at least, to 
the special sort of "science," by contrast with more usual contemporary meanings 
of "science," that a dialectical science must be. Likewise, his "strong-compati-
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bility" claim of a "dialectical" relationship between Marxism and Christianity 
(p. 211-it is here that he introduces the adjective, "dialectical," significantly 
enough in scare quotes, by way of characterizing this relationship in contrast to 
the formal logical requirements of the "weak-compatibility" thesis) might well 
have been rendered more plausible if he had somewhere provided an analysis 
of just what he might mean by "dialectical" in this context. In Dupre's book, 
on the other hand, both the richness and the plurality of meanings of "dialectic" 
and of the key related notion of "dialectical contradiction" are explored at length 
(in Chapter Three) in such a way as to deepen the reader's comprehension in 
preference to avoiding complexity; it is clearly the historical background that 
Dupre brings to bear which makes this possible. 
There is something to be said in favor of Turner's more "creative" scholarship 
(using this term in a way that is roughly similar in meaning to the expression, 
"creative bookkeeping"), however, when one contrasts his and Dupre's treatments 
of "ideology." What Dupre has to say about this notion, the topic of the last 
regular chapter of his book, suffers under the burden of the fact that, while it 
is of very great importance for understanding Marx and later Marxisms particu-
larly with respect to the critique of culture, Marx said very little explicitly about 
it. Moreover, as Dupre himself well documents, the infrequent usages of the 
tern1 by Marx and Engels themselves were inconsistent; in fact, Dupre argues, 
Engels' reductionist epistemology (the view that ideological structures simply 
depend upon or "reflect" existing productive forces in some way) had the effect 
of removing any basis for adequately distinguishing the false from the true, so 
that "Henceforth 'ideology' came to mean a socially determined, rather than a 
false, ideal complex." (p. 240) Turner, on the other hand, comparatively unbur-
dened as he is by scholarly judgements about this loss of critical bite in the 
evolution of the connotations of "ideology" in "mainstream" Marxism (a loss 
which, by the way, I do not believe to have been as great as Dupre does within 
other currents of the Marxian tradition), is able to generate new insights into 
possible uses and implications of the term by means, in large part, of a nostalgic 
but refreshing resurrection of some of the old techniques of linguistic analysis, 
specifically by applying them to typical nineteenth-century talk about "one's 
betters." What emerges is a clearer understanding of what Marx should have 
meant by ideology as a praxis, given the value of this concept as a tool of radical 
social criticism. My principal regret about this otherwise very worthwhile part 
of Turner's book is that in it he makes no use, as he might very profitably have 
done, of Sartre's famous analysis of "bad faith" and of the abundant Anglo-Amer-
ican literature about "self-deception" that that analysis helped feed. But then, 
when Turner does refer very briefly to Sartre, by way of citing a passage from 
Nausea as it is cited, in tum, in a book by Iris Murdoch (pp. 10-11), his reference 
shows a degree of understanding of his subject that I would find intolerably low 
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in a high school student, and so it may be just as well that he did not attempt 
to make any efforts in this direction. As I have indicated, scholarly accuracy is 
not Turner's forte. 
What is Turner's forte is what might be termed "prophecy" in a quasi-Biblical 
sense: the articulate expression of intense anger at the practices of a profoundly 
immoral society. It may therefore be of interest to conclude this review of the 
two very different books by examining briefly Turner's identification of Marxism 
with the moral point of view. 
(3) I have already attempted summarily to explain what Turner's "morality is 
Marxism" thesis amounts to--no easy task. Turner is, of course, aware that at 
least a few contemporary moral philosophers and Christian theologians may find 
this claim somewhat provocative and perhaps even implausible. To reconstruct 
Turner's position in different terms, the view amounts to the assertion that 
Marxist theory has accurately described the fundamental structural elements of 
the capitalist system and the (ideological) mechanisms whereby this system 
perpetually "sells" itself to enough members of our society in order to keep itself 
in business, so to speak. But to engage in such description, if it is indeed accurate, 
is to carry out properly the enterprise of moral thinking. (Moreover, gi ven the 
radical immorality of a society governed by capitalist practice, it is probably, 
Turner seems to be saying, the most that we can expect from this enterprise at 
the present time.) 
This position requires, of course, a stipulative definition of "morality" (in the 
sense of moral thinking) that differs from some of those that are still more 
commonly held. Turner insists, in fact, that "it is not just a matter of words. It 
is an error of substance to call by the name of 'morality' what has been done 
under that name by philosophers from Kant to Hare." (p. 85) He evokes Classical 
views of ethics and maintains that Marx should be located within the Classical 
tradition (i .e., Plato, Aristotle) in this regard. I agree in large measure with 
Turner on this last-mentioned point. While the spectre of Alasdair MacIntyre 
(whom, in fact, Turner invokes in a slightly different context in an earlier chapter 
of his book) necessarily haunts contemporary philosophical discussions of the 
meaning of "morality," and there is much in MacIntyre's more positive theses 
about the nature of virtue with which neither Marx nor Turner nor I could possibly 
agree, there is considerable validity to MacIntyre's point of view that what counts 
as the mainstream approach to ethics in the Anglo-American philosophical world 
today is primarily a product of certain late-eighteenth-century turns of thought 
and by no means paradigmatic of all possible types of rational thinking about 
morality. It is a failure to appreciate the far-reaching implications of this obser-
vation that skews and weakens a large proportion of the recent spate of literature, 
much of it by philosophers with "analytic training" (whatever that now means), 
about Marx and justice, Marx and rights, Marx and morality in general. It is 
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something of a paradox that Turner, who from this volume appears to be virtually 
innocent offamiliarity with recent Continental European philosophy (characteris-
tically, for example, his own reference to Habermas is to an essay by the latter 
that was published in London in an anthology edited by Emmett and MacIntyre), 
advances a perspective that is just about as radically antithetical to the still 
dominant one on the nature of morality as it is possible to imagine. 
Clearly, he goes much too far if one takes him literally. To demonstrate just 
why his central thesis on Marxism and morality, as he states and explicates it, 
is indefensible would require a detailed discussion for which there is insufficient 
space in a brief critical review. To begin with, contrary to the Turnerian assertions 
that I cited in the previous paragraph, the question of what "morality" means is 
partly "a matter of words," a question of "stipulation," as I expressed it, as well 
as being partly a matter of substance; and to call the view that Kant and even 
Turner's bere noire, R. M. Hare, to say nothing of the thousands of thinkers in 
between them within this broad tradition, were doing morality "an error of 
substance" is to rewrite the history of thought (which rightly identifies many 
important continuities between Aristotle and Kant, Aristotle and Hare, etc.) more 
violently than even the most dedicated deconstructionist has envisioned in his 
or her wildest dreams. But Turner should not always be read very literally. What 
he intends to convey through his argument that "morality is Marxism" is, I 
repeat, a prophetic sense of extreme outrage-born in large measure from a 
Christian vision, the various contemporary institutionalizations of which continue 
hypocritically to support what they are in principle committed to oppose-at the 
systematic injustices that are ingredient in capitalism; it is these injustices that 
Marxist theory, as the radically critical perspective par excellence on capitalism, 
has most comprehensively described. Understood (somewhat reconstructed, 
perhaps, if one prefers) in this way, Turner's viewpoint is one that I share. 
A Worldly Spirituality: The Call to Take Care of the Earth, by Wesley Granberg-
Michaelson. San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1984 Pp. xiv and 210. $12.95. 
Reviewed by PAUL FABER, Fort Hays State University. 
"Sin, salvation, service." When I was growing up, the pastor of my family's 
church was fond of alliterative triads. This triad was his way of describing the 
entire message of Christ; it could be used, however, to describe A Worldly 
Spirituality by Wesley Granberg-Michaelson as well. 
Granberg-Michaelson is known, at least by name, to many in the evangelical 
community. He spent eight years as the chief legislative assistant to Senator 
Mark Hatfield, and he has written for periodicals such as The Other Side and 
